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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of human capital as a hedge against
future unexpected changes in consumption of nontradable goods. We
show, in line with Baxter-Jermann (1997) that human capital aggra-
vates the home country bias, although we find a lower increase of the
bias based on an empirical analysis for the U.S. economy.
1 Introduction
The theory of international finance assumes rational international investors
to share risk optimally. If they do so and hedge risk across countries, then
all resources are used most efficiently. Since the 1970s financial economists
pointed out that domestic investors tend to underinvest in foreign securities.
This empirical finding is known as the home country bias puzzle (see French
and Poterba, 1991). Many studies addressed the home bias puzzle since.
Although some elements of the puzzle seem to be solved a large fraction of
the problem is still not clear (see Lewis, 1999, for a review). In their review of
major puzzles in international macroeconomics Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000)
therefore label the home bias puzzle as one of their six mysteries.
In this paper we do not pretend to solve the home country bias puzzle.
We study a small detail of the puzzle: the role of nontraded wealth, in
particular the role of human capital. The role of human capital in solving
the puzzle seems not so promising since Baxter and Jermann (1997). At first
sight one might be convinced of the fact that, if goods cannot be traded and
domestic investors expect to be paid in terms of these goods, they are willing
to hold more assets that are linked up with nontradables. This would solve
the home bias puzzle to some extent, since domestic investors like to hold
domestic equity. Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that domestic human
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capital returns are highly correlated with domestic but not with foreign
stock market returns. Since human capital is nonmarketable, this finding
implies that international investors should hold even more foreign assets.
The inclusion of human capital in the model explaining the puzzle thus
worsens the magnitude of the problem.
We give alternative estimates of the relevant correlations between returns
on human capital and domestic and foreign asset returns. From our results
it is clear that human capital indeed worsens the home bias puzzle but to
a smaller extent than Baxter and Jermann suggest. In order to present our
arguments we first discuss the highlights of the home bias puzzle theory
and some empirical estimates of the magnitude of the puzzle in section
2. Next we present a framework to include human capital in full-fledged
expected utility optimizing model in section 3. After that we present our
empirical estimates and compare them with previous findings in section 4.
We conclude in section 5.
2 The home country bias: models and estimates
The equity home bias puzzle is most easily understood in mean-variance ef-
ficient frontier analysis. As Lewis (1999) shows a 100 per cent US portfolio
is dominated by a portfolio with at least 40 per cent foreign equity. As we
show below empirical estimates of foreign equity holdings are much lower
than 40 per cent. The importance of this finding is large. If investors do not
optimally allocate their financial wealth, international risk sharing is subop-
timal, and consumption plans cannot be carried out. Indeed, macroeconomic
consumption analysis shows that ex post marginal rates of substitution in
consumption are unequal across countries, while complete risk sharing would
imply equality. So the real consequences of the equity home bias are rather
big and therefore the home bias deserves attention.
What are the standard explanations of the equity home bias? The first
class of explanations suggests that domestic equities provide a better hedge
for risks that are specific to the home country. Lewis (1999) describes three
types of these possible sources of risk: inflation, nontraded wealth (such
as human capital), and the impact of the multinational character of corpo-
rations. If Purchasing Power Parity does not hold in the very short run,
international diversification is wanted for. The role of nontraded wealth is
discussed below. The fact that stock prices of multinational corporations
correlate strongly with domestic market developments do not make this line
of thinking promising to explain the puzzle either. The second class of ex-
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planations of the puzzle look at a cost-benefit analysis of diversification. If
the costs exceed the gains, there would be a limit to diversifying the portfo-
lios. Lewis concludes that this is unlikely, since new information and trade
systems make trade cheaper through time. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) think
that trading costs are important and probably an exlanation of the home
bias though. Finally, Lewis (1999) asks some attention for the third class of
explanations of the puzzle: the impact of uncertainty in returns on the di-
versification strategy. If returns are uncertain the hypothesis that portfolios
with foreign investments are not better performers than domestic portfolios
alone cannot be rejected. This would imply that an analysis of the timing of
investment is relevant. In line with this it is of course interesting to analyze
flows instead of stocks.
We do not give a general analysis of the equity home bias but focus on the
analysis of the role of human capital. Human capital is a large component
of nontraded wealth (for the US about 60 per cent, if this share can be
approximated by the labor’s share in total income). If nontraded wealth is
important, human capital would be the number one component to consider.
Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that the returns on human capital correlate
with returns on domestic assets for Japan, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S..
There is a lower correlation with foreign returns on capital. This implies
that individuals who want to hold a diversified portfolio need a short and not
a long position in domestic marketable assets. Baxter and Jermann (1997)
proxy the returns on human capital by a bi-variate time-series analysis of
labor and capital income assuming stationarity of the labor share of income
in the long run. In this paper we simply include the wage rate as a measure of
return on human capital. This has a stronger appeal to the idea that earned
wages indicate the productivity of human capital. Moreover, as we show
this approximation leads to a lower correlation between human capital and
domestic returns, with resulting consequences for the equity home bias. A
related study is Bottazzi, Pesenti and Van Wincoop (1996). They investigate
the impact of fluctuations in the return to human capital on the composition
of international asset portfolios and adopt a continuous-time VAR model
of international portfolio choice which allows for intertemporal interactions
between wage rates and capital returns. Applying the model to a large set
of OECD countries, their findings account for an average bias of about 30
percentage points toward domestic securities.
How big is the home bias? Without pretending to give a complete survey
we illustrate the findings up to now. For the U.S. normally a huge bias
towards domestic assets is found. Tesar and Werner (1998) illustrate that
the U.S. home bias seems to decline by the mid-1990s though. For example
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French and Poterba (1991) find that in 1989 the U.S. investor allocated 94
per cent of his equity portfolio to domestic equity. Cooper and Kaplanis
(1991) conclude that in 1987 the average American investor has allocated
98 per cent of his total equity investment into domestic assets. Investors in
Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany are not performing differently by
allocating respectively 86.7, 78.5, and 75.4 per cent into domestic equities.
Bohn and Tesar (1996) report a home equity bias for the U.S. of 92 per
cent. For bond holdings the home bias is smaller but not small enough to
neglect (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). German and Swiss data examined by
Gehrig (1993) confirm the stronger bias in equity holdings indeed. For 1987
Gehrig finds that German funds hold only 20 per cent of their total equity
holdings in foreign equity,- the proportion of foreign bonds of their total bond
holdings is about 30 per cent. Examining the portfolio composition of Swiss
banks in 1985, it is shown that 36 per cent of the equity portfolio consists
of foreign equity and only 45 per cent of the bond portfolio is foreign. Tesar
and Werner (1995) find for 1988 similar results by investigating life insurance
companies and pension funds. For example, Japanese and American pension
funds hold only 7 and 4 per cent of their total portfolio in foreign assets.
3 The model
In this section we illustrate the equity home bias in the Pesenti-Van Wincoop
(1996) model (PW model). We discuss our amendment of human capital in
detail. The PW model is a rational expectations representative agent model
that allows for nontraded goods. The representative consumer maximizes
expected utility over an infinite horizon. Utility is a function of the con-
sumption of both traded C and nontraded goods X. The consumer faces







where γ represents the discount factor and 0 ≤ t ≤ s. The utility func-
tion has the usual properties plus the characteristic of complementarity of
tradables and nontradables UCX > 0. The complementarity assumption
has a strong implication: the consumer only makes a choice for one of the
variables. The domestic industry produces nontradable goods such that the
supply is given by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dX(t)
X(t)
= µdt+ σXdξ(t) (2)
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with ξ(t) normal Brownian motion, and µ and σX parameters. ξ(t) is as-
sumed to be standard Brownian motion.1
The consumer can save and accumulate wealth Q(t):
dQ(t) = [n(t)dR(t) + (1− n(t))dR∗(t)]W (t) + L(t)dw(t)− C(t)dt− E(t)dt
(3)
This expression implies that wealth increases by investing n(t) at home
with a cumulative return R(t), and (1 − n(t)) in a foreign asset with a
return R∗(t), by a return w(t) on human capital L(t), and decreases by
consumption C(t) and education expenditure E(t). We added the return
on human capital and the education expenditure to the PW-specification.
The consumer problem is so to determine optimal consumption, education
expenses and the portfolio plan. PW assume instantaneously stochastic
returns on domestic and foreign equities;
dR(t) = ηdt+ σRdω(t) (4)
dR∗(t) = ηdt+ σR∗dω∗(t) (5)
with η the common expected return and the ω’s the standard Brownian
motion processes. Furthermore PW assume the following correlations: ρ =
(dωdω∗)/dt, ρRX = (dωdξ)/dt, and ρR∗X = (dω∗dξ)/dt.
Since we include human capital and its return, we need to specify their
stochastics. We describe the availability of human capital by the geometric
Brownian motion:
dL(t) = E(t)dt+ σLL(t)dB(t) (6)
where σL represents the volatility and B(t) a standard Brownian motion.
Human capital can be increased via education expenditure E(t). The returns
on human capital, w(t) are assumed to be stochastic:
dw(t) = αdt+ σwdφ(t) (7)
where α is the drift rate, σw the volatility, and φ(t) a standard Brownian
motion. Furthermore we assume that the return on human capital correlates
with the financial assets: ρRw = (dωdφ)/dt, and ρR∗w = (dω∗dφ)/dt.
The optimization problem now is the maximization of (1) with respect
to the choice of the paths of C, n, and E given conditions (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), and (7). The problem is solved by using the Bellman equation. It




breaks a whole sequence into two components: the immediate decision and
a value function V that encapsulates the future. The general structure of
the continuous time Bellman equation is:




On the left-hand side we have the normal return that the holder of an asset
worth V will require. The first term on the right-hand side is the immediate
pay-out, while the second term is the capital gain. The Bellman equation
can be seen as a no-arbitrage condition. In this case we have two state
variables X and Q. So the Bellman equation has the following form:
δV [X(t), Q(t)] = max
C,E,n
U(C(t), X(t)) + Et [dV [X(t), Q(t)]] /dt (9)
The problem of solving the Bellman equation is the problem of describing
Et[dV ]/dt. So we expand dV using Itoˆ’s Lemma. For the home bias we are







The first part of this result is a standard mean-variance portfolio solution.






















where Q−L represents financial wealth. The first component of this bias is
equal to the one found by PW. Our extension is represented by the second
term. What is the economic interpretation of this bias? The bias is formed
as a result of hedging the risk of future consumption of nontradables. Both
domestic and foreign assets can be used for hedging. The consumer must
be able to finance tradables whatever the consumption of nontradables is.
If domestic asset returns correlate positively with nontradable consumption
domestic assets will deliver the required returns. So the bias depends on
ρRX . Furthermore the scope for hedging increases if the variance of non-
tradable consumption increases. PW also show that the propensity to hedge
H depends on the complementarity of tradables and nontradables UCX .
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What’s now the role of human capital? One important result to notice
is the Baxter-Jermann (1997) finding. The bias is reduced if the correlation
between return on human capital and domestic assets (ρRw) is large and
between human capital and foreign assets (ρR∗w) is small or negative. We
will illustrate this with U.S. data in the next section.
4 Empirical estimates
Next we will use the definition of the bias given before in the model with
human capital for U.S. data. The annual data on nontradables consumption
are from the OECD National Accounts. These annual data are available at
current prices. We have defined nontradables consumption as the sum of
gross rent, fuel and power; medical care and health expenses; recreational,
entertainment, education and cultural services; personal care; expenditures
in restaurants, cafes, hotels; transport and communication minus personal
transport equipment. The annual returns on domestic assets (dR) are de-
termined as follows:
dR = θdRSTOCK + (1− θ)r (12)
where dRSTOCK is the annual return on stock by MSCI monthly data. The
risk-free rate r is assumed to be equal to the end of period FED discount rate
(taken from the International Financial Statistics). θ is the ratio of stock
market capitalization to total financial claims. The total financial claims
are assumed to equal the sum of stock market value, long term government
debt and M2. Data on long term government debt and M2 come from the
International Financial Statistics and the U.S. stock market value data come
from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.. The return on foreign assets (dR∗)
is determined in a similar way. However, we have made some assumptions.
First of all we assume that θ∗ is equal to θ in each year. Furthermore we
assume that the risk-free rate r∗ is two basis points below the U.S. rate
r. We have selected a group of 12 countries that represents the rest of the
world2 . For each country, we determine the annual return on stock by using
the MSCI monthly data. These annual returns are then weighted by 1985
GDP per adult in order to find an approximation for the return on foreign
stock. We use GDP per adult inhabitant instead of GDP per capita because
GDP per adult is a better measure for productivity. Further we need data
on human capital. We were able to find wage-rate adjustments for U.S.
2These countries are Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, U.K., Australia, The
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
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industries. The data are from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S.. This data
tells us how the returns on human capital develop over time and enables us
to estimate the volatility of wages.
Next we discuss the estimation of the volatility parameters σR, σR∗, and
σl. Assume that the sample {∆Rt : t = 1, . . . , n}, {∆R∗t : t = 1, . . . , n},
and {∆ωt = 1, . . . , n} are drawn from the processes (4), (5) and (7). It is
known that ∆Rt and ∆Rt+s are i.i.d. variables for all t and s. The same is
true for ∆R∗t and ∆ωt. We apply OLS to find estimates for α and η and the









For the geometric Brownian motion X we follow Bjo¨rk (1998) . Let ψt =




where ψ¯ is the mean of ψ. Finally we estimate the parameters ρ, ρRX , ρR∗X ,
ρRw, and ρR∗w by taking the observed correlation between the samples con-
sidered. The sample period starts in 1970 and ends in 1996.
As PW we assume a CES-utility function and use their estimate of the
propensity to hedge H=0.7.3 A last assumption we made is with respect to
the ratio of human capital to financial wealth L/(Q−L) which we take to be
0.5. Table 1 gives the main results. The upper panel shows our estimates for
two periods: 1970-1996 and 1983-1996. The lower panel the outcomes. MV
stands for the mean-variance result, n for the implied domestic portfolio
share, B for the bias, BX for the bias due to the hedging of nontradables
and BL for the hedging due to human capital.
The first thing to notice in Table 1 are the estimates of ρRw and ρR∗w.
Our estimates do suggest a positive correlation between human capital and
domestic assets, but much smaller than Baxter-Jermann find. On the other
hand we find even a negative correlation of the return on human capital and





αX1−1/ + (1− α)C1−1/
] (1−η)
−1 (15)
For constructing the propensity to hedge it is necessary to estimate the parameters η and
. See Pesenti and Van Wincoop (1996).
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foreign assets, while Baxter-Jermann find small positive correlations. As a
result we do find a bias, although smaller than Baxter-Jermann. And indeed
the role of human capital aggravates the problem (look at the negative values
of BL). Our findings seem to be more reasonable than the Baxter-Jermann
results in this respect. One can see that in our model the mean variance
solution explains a large proportion of n. This is mainly due to the high
volatility of foreign assets and the positive correlation between domestic and
foreign asset returns.
5 Summary and conclusions
We analyze the role of human capital in the equity home bias model. We
derive an explicit solution for the home bias using the Pesenti-Van Wincoop
(1996) model. It is shown that human capital, being an important compo-
nent of nontraded wealth, plays an important role in the equity home bias
puzzle. If the return on human capital is positively correlated with the yield
on domestic assets human capital will lower the bias, as Baxter and Jermann
(1997) showed, and therefore increase the problem of explaining the bias.
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We illustrate our model with some stylized facts for the U.S. economy and
indeed find that introducing human capital does lead to more problems in
explaining the bias, but not to the extent Baxter and Jermann suggest.
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